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among the Gulf States?
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Arab states of the Persian Gulf have played a huge role in the unfold-
ing developments of the Arab Spring, especially in Egypt. Based on many
pieces of evidence, we can set up an analytical framework for investigat-
ing the transformations of Egyptian politics between 2011 and 2013, ac-
cording to which the turmoil was basically a proxy cold war fought by
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait on one hand, and
Qatar on the other.
Although the Gulf agreement signed in April 2014 clearly shows the in-
evitability of the defeat of Qatar, Doha will remain an important player in
the region, while the rebound of the Muslim Brotherhood is now unimag-
inable without the support of the tiny country.
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Introduction
Almost every narrative which is used by analysts and journalists to describe and typify
the unfolding process in Egypt holds a common element: they see the events as clear
evidence of the continuous decrease of American influence in the country and in the
broader region as well. It is obvious that the U.S. is not among those countries which
roll the dices in the North African country: Washington lacks a clear strategy and the
necessary means to shape the ongoing events in Egypt.
But if the world’s number one economic and military power is currently not among
those which determine the future of Egypt, then which ones are? Which countries have
the greatest leverage over the events? What kind of external rivalry sets the agenda in
Egypt?
Many pieces of evidence indicate that the Gulf countries, primarily Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the one hand, and Qatar on the other, have
fought a proxy cold war with each
other in Egypt between 2011 and
2013. They have undoubtedly
been present in Egypt financially
and logistically, supporting one
side or the other, backing the par-
ties and subsidizing the Egyptian economy, and therefore their role is of major impor-
tance when one tries to foresee the future of the North African country.
This paper aims at analyzing the role and behavior of the Gulf states and their primary
interests and goals in the Egyptian conflict. While the topic contains several method-
ological challenges – primarily because of its unresolved and constantly changing na-
ture – we are trying to build up a unique narrative for the past three years in order to im-
prove our understanding of what actually happened in Egypt.
Analysis
An alliance in need: the relations between Egypt and the Gulf
before 2011
Before the 2011 revolution, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and
Egypt shared a lot of common interests and security concerns. As they were part of the
pro-Western, anti-Islamist Sunni block in the Middle East, the stability and security of
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these countries were tied to the American presence in and support for the Middle East.
Since the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Tehran, the Gulf countries were squeezed be-
tween two aggressive and hostile governments, the Iraqi and the Iranian government,
both of which made territorial claims towards and ideologically criticized the Gulf
regimes.2 In spite of the clear fact that Saudi Arabia and Egypt, with their different po-
litical and ideological systems, competed against each other for dominance over the
Sunni Arab world, we can say that a strong Egypt, as a moderate, heavyweight Sunni
Arab country without any hostile intention towards the Gulf, was in the interest of the
Gulf monarchies. The reason behind this is that a forceful Cairo would have been able
to neutralize the dual threat of the Iraqi-Iranian rivalry. Unfortunately for them,
though, the country was not able to play this role after the rapid shrinking of its re-
gional influence in the 1980s.3 On the other hand, with its regional ambitions and de-
creasing leverage in the Arab world after Camp David, Egypt welcomed the friendly and
generous intentions of the Gulf countries. At the same time, though, the Gulf countries
were also suspicious of not just Shia groups and countries, but Islamists as well, since
both Egypt and the Peninsula had experienced severe domestic crises because of their
own internal religious oppositions.
The need for a mutually beneficial cooperation manifested itself in two key events in
the early 1990s – firstly, in the staunch Egyptian support of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in
the Second Gulf War (for which the Gulf countries expressed their gratitude with a $6.7
billion loan to Egypt)4 and, secondly, in the signing of the so-called Damascus Declara-
tion,5 which “established a nominal military alliance between the Gulf Arab states,
Egypt, and Syria”.6 Although this agreement did not become a reality, it clearly showed
the recognition of the mutual security concerns by all the parties. The position of Egypt
in the alliance network of the GCC even strengthened after the relations between Syria
and Saudi Arabia deteriorated because of Damascus’ support for Iran and its presumable
participation in the murder of the Lebanonese ex-PM Rafic Hariri, who was considered
a reliable friend of Riyadh.7
Although the Gulf countries are usually viewed as a somewhat homogeneous security
block with particular geopolitical circumstances, they have different foreign interests
and goals. The source of their disagreements can be tracked down to the lack of trust
and the domestic, historical and social differences among them, and it can easily be
seen in their different approaches towards Iran. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain
and Abu Dhabi, all of which contain significant Shia communities,8 see Tehran as a
clear threat to their national security, Oman, Qatar and Dubai, with their historical, cul-
tural and commercial ties with Tehran, are less hostile to the Islamic Republic.9 As Iran
is the cornerstone of the security environment of the Gulf, this disagreement has severe
consequences in other fields as well. The divisions between the GCC countries became
more visible with the 1995 soft coup in Qatar, after which the new emir Hamad bin
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Khalifa Al Thani implemented a new foreign policy, which is very different from that of
the other countries. This new agenda includes an opening towards Iran and Sunni Is-
lamist forces (among others) in or-
der to gain regional influence and
strengthen the regime stability at
home.
In the 1990s, the signs of this divi-
sion inside the GCC came to the
surface regarding Egypt as well.
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the influential
Egyptian Islamic theologian,10
who was imprisoned by King Farouq and by Gamal Abdul Nasser as well, lived in Qatar
since the early 1960s.11 After the 1995 coup, the new Qatari leadership supported the es-
tablishment of the Al-Jazeera television network and the IslamOnline website, both of
which became influential among the Islamic public. The name of al-Qaradawi is at-
tached to both media (for example, he has a programme on Al-Jazeera called Sharia and
Life); these platforms helped al-Qaradawi to reach publics all over the world.12 Besides
the Qatari generosity towards al-Qaradawi, the Gulf countries had stood completely be-
hind Mubarak’s regime before the revolution.
Reactions and check-diplomacy: the activity of the Gulf
countries during the Egyptian revolution
After the outburst of the 2011 revolution in Egypt, it was clear from day one that the
Gulf countries have different opinions about the events taking place. As was foreseeable,
Saudi King Abdullah quickly expressed his country’s support for Mubarak. On the 29th
of January, he said,13 “no Arab or Muslim can tolerate any meddling in the security and
stability of Arab and Muslim Egypt by those who infiltrated the people in the name of
freedom of expression, exploiting it to inject their destructive hatred. (…) As they con-
demn this, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its people and government declares [sic] it
stands with all its resources with the government of Egypt and its people.“
Such a Saudi approach was not surprising – the foreign policy of Riyadh has long been
characterized by fighting against Islamists abroad, mainly through political and finan-
cial support.14 Moreover, the Saudi government has always seen the Muslim Brother-
hood as an ideological foe, since the two sidesʼ interpretations of Islam hugely differ.15
We could say that backing Mubarak against a revolution with a fear of the rise of the
Brotherhood is natural from the Saudi point of view.
Other Gulf countries were also active regarding the Egyptian events. In February 2011,
the foreign minister of the UAE issued an ambiguous statement about the revolution.
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He confirmed his country’s “confidence in the ability of the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces in running the country’s affairs in these delicate circumstances in such a
way that would realize aspirations and hopes of the Egyptian people”.16 Comparing the
statements of Abdullah and the UAE foreign minister, we can clearly see that they were
driven by different ideas: the Saudi kingʼs quote does not accept the revolution as a way
for the Egyptian people to stand
up for their “aspirations and
hopes”, but he rather sees it as a
quasi-provocation and a deception
of Islamist forces. However, the
words of the UAE’s foreign minis-
ter are also supportive towards the
military, so we cannot say that the federal state was completely on the side of the revo-
lution.
At the same time, the official comment of the Qatari Royal Council was very distant
from this view. According to the BBC,17 the emir called the resignation of Mubarak “a
positive, important step toward the Egyptian people’s aspirations of achieving democ-
racy and reform and a life of dignity”. The tone of the Qatari message was more like that
of a Turkish or a Western statement rather than that of an authoritarian leader.
After the resignation of Mubarak, the cracks on the longstanding Saudi-Egyptian al-
liance became visible. Before the elections took place, the Saudis promised to send fi-
nancial help to Egypt, but later in 2012 there were some intense diplomatic disputes be-
tween Cairo and Riyadh regarding the mistreatment of Egyptian pilgrims on Saudi soil
and the arrest of Ahmed el-Gezawari, an Egyptian lawyer, in Saudi Arabia because of his
alleged possession of a banned
anxiety drug.18 In fact, the Saudi
ambassador had to be recalled for
a short period of time because of
the overwhelming public anger in
Egypt against the Kingdom.
The situation got more interesting
after the 2012 elections. The re-
sults were welcomed by the GCC, but at that time there was no major government that
would publicly criticize the victory of Morsi.19 It was quite meaningful that after losing
the elections, Ahmed Safiq, Mubarak’s ex-PM, almost immediately flew to the UAE.20
However, Qatar’s emir was among the first leaders who congratulated the first demo-
cratically elected president of Egypt. The words quickly transformed into money: dur-
ing Morsi’s year as president, Doha poured almost $8 billion into Egypt, becoming one
of the most important supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood’s government. Egypt was
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not the only country in which Doha subsidized some factions of the Islamic opposition:
the Syrian and the Libyan “brothers” received help from Qatar too.21
Though the Saudi government was not highly enthusiastic about the events, they tried
to maintain a stable relationship with Morsi. The new Egyptian president flew to Riyadh
in July 2012 to negotiate with the Saudi leadership. “Whoever [...] the Egyptian presi-
dent [is], the Saudis know they have to deal with Egypt and have good relations with
Egypt”, said a Saudi commentator.22 This observation, however, is contradicted by the
fact that Riyadh did not open its checkbook for Egypt during the Morsi presidency.23
The true feelings of the Saudi leadership about the Muslim Brotherhood came to the
surface after the removal of Morsi by the military. After the takeover, King Abdullah
congratulated the interim head of state Adli Mansour. The words of the UAE foreign
minister on this topic were also telling: “the great Egyptian army was able to prove again
that they are the fence of Egypt and that they are the protector and strong shield that
guarantee [sic] Egypt will remain a state of institutions and law”.24 Bahrain also shortly
followed its neighbors in support-
ing the military.25
After the coup, Kuwait, Saudi Ara-
bia and the UAE (primarily Abu
Dhabi) agreed to give Egypt an aid
package worth $12 billion, includ-
ing a huge shipment of crude and diesel oil worth $200 million. Interestingly enough,
the Saudi government has been accused of giving the Egyptian army, namely General
el-Sisi, $1 billion in order to help him smite the Brotherhood.26 The General is not a
stranger to the Saudi government: long ago he worked as a military attaché in Riyadh.27
The Saudis also wanted to neutralize the role of the United States when they promised
the military that they would replace any aid cut off by Washington.28
The motives and goals of the parties
After looking over these facts we can clearly see that the Gulf countries are divided over
Egypt: Qatar is supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, while Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are backing the military. With their generous fi-
nancial support, the Gulf countries became the main financiers of both sides. While the
U.S. provides only $1.5 billion to Egypt annually, the Morsi government received $8 bil-
lion from Qatar, and the new military leadership will get $12 billion from other Gulf
countries.29 The difference between these numbers is meaningful.
But what is the reason behind the Gulf countries fighting each other in Egypt? Why are
they spending their money on such a chaotic situation where anything could happen?
Why is Egypt so important for the Gulf countries that they are willing to pay billions of
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dollars to protect their interests in it? The main motives can be summarized in the fol-
lowing points:
• Qatar’s foreign policy: It is easy to see that since Sheikh Hamad overthrew his father in
1995 and became the emir of Qatar, his most important foreign policy aim was to dif-
ferentiate Qatar from its neighbors and to gain as much regional leverage as he could.30
In spite of the conservative low-profile checkbook diplomacy of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
and the UAE, Qatar implemented a harsh, loud and proactive foreign policy, which in-
cluded finding new allies and building new relations. According to the Qatari leader-
ship, Sunni Islamist movements31 could become useful allies for the country against
Doha’s huge Saudi neighbor if they seize power in Middle Eastern countries; on the
other hand, supporting such groups as the Muslim Brotherhood could be a popular
step at home; it could be important for the Qatari regimeʼs legitimacy, as the Qatari
public feels displeasure about the government’s alliance with the U.S.32
• The domestic problems in the conservative Gulf countries: Since the beginning of the
Arab Spring, the Gulf monarchs have beenmore suspicious about internal groups crit-
icizing the regimes and not without any reason, since such powerful anti-establish-
ment movements had been unprecedented for decades.33 This tendency was avoided
in Qatar, while in other countries the voices calling for a more transparent gover-
nance made the authorities implement serious measures. In Saudi Arabia many of the
organizers of the 2012 Saudi petition calling for a constitutional monarchy were im-
prisoned, and the 2012 protests of the Shia minority in the Eastern Province of the
Kingdom were answered with “a combination of heavy security and negotiations”.34
At the same time, in the United Arab Emirates 70 people were jailed in 2013 on the
grounds that they were participating in an Islamist group, and another 30 people (in-
cluding Egyptian citizens) were arrested for unauthorized fundraising for the Muslim
Brotherhood in the UAE.35 It is easy to see that these countries consider the strength-
ening of the Muslim Brotherhood as a regional phenomenon which threatens their
domestic security; therefore they are willing to fight against it. What we can see here
is a different perception of national security by the Gulf states.
• The role of Iran: According to some analysts, the mutual sympathy betweenMorsi and
Tehran was the most important reason behind the army overthrowing the president.
In February 2013 the visit of Ahmadinejad in Cairo and his promise to defend Egypt
against any attack36 were very suspicious for the Generals and for the Gulf states as
well. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi saw Morsi as a new ally of Tehran who had
to be eliminated. On the other hand, the primary motivation of Qatar, which has
more ties with Iran but sees Tehran without any illusions, is to pacify the unfriendly
relationship between the Islamic Republic and the other Middle East countries. Hav-
ing a Sunni Arab leader who is friendly with both Iran and Israel at the same time
would have been a positive step regarding this factor.
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• Relations with Hamas: Since the late 1990s, Qatar has been regarded as a supporter of
Hamas.37 Supporting Hamas is a rather questionable move in the Sunni Arab coun-
tries due to the Palestine organization’s good relation with Tehran. However, as
Hamas started to stand beside the Syrian rebels, Iran cut its funding for it (which
amounted to $20 million a month),38 which made the Palestine organization search
for new financers. Since Hamas and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have an out-
standing relationship, it was evident that the Morsi-led Egypt would be a fine ally for
it.39 This change was rather comfortable for Qatar as well, since Doha competed with
Iran for influence over Palestine for years. With the overthrow of Morsi, however,
Hamas probably lost its new supporter, which puts pressure on the Palestine organi-
zation to move closer to Tehran again. This would cause serious harm to Qatar’s lever-
age in the Gaza Strip.
Conclusion
With all these aspects in mind, an analytical narrative can be set up for Egypt which
would interpret the events as a proxy cold war by the Gulf states against each other in
the period between 2011 and
2013.40 In general, this rivalry has
two main motives: on the one
hand, we can see different percep-
tions of regime security and “na-
tional” interest among the differ-
ent Gulf governments; on the oth-
er hand, a traditional power play can be observed between the tiny but ambitious Qatar
and the huge but conservative Saudi Arabia (and its allies). This rivalry started before
the Egyptian revolution and before the Arab Spring as well. Throughout this strife Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait became the main known financers of the two sides in
Egypt; therefore their rivalry determines the future of the Egyptian unrest.
But by 2014, it looks like the competition is basically over because of two dominant fac-
tors. Firstly, the domestic and international position of the Egyptian army is currently
far better than that of the Muslim Brotherhood, and so for the time being we cannot ex-
pect a comeback of the organization.
Secondly, the Saudis are clearly moving forward to win the rivalry with Qatar. The signs
of the coming of this future triumph are numerous. At the end of June 2013, right be-
fore the army’s crackdown on Morsi and the Brotherhood, a new emir, namely Sheikh
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, came to power in Qatar. Many suggested that the new lead-
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ership would turn the wheel of the country’s foreign policy to a less activist manner,
which was partly true:41 though Doha condemned the Egyptian army’s crackdown on
Morsi’s supporters,42 the tone of the official Qatari comments on Egypt has clearly
changed. After the ouster of Morsi, the emir congratulated the interim president Adli
Mansour; at the same time a foreign ministry spokesperson said that “Qatar will con-
tinue to respect the will and choice of the Egyptian people”.43 The shift from the coun-
try’s previous position is obvious.
Afterwards, however, it turned out that the change was not fundamental, since the
Qatari government, along with Al-Jazeera, continued to support the Muslim Brother-
hood. 44 The Gulf countries lost their patience with the tiny country, and therefore on
the 5th of March, 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates withdrew
their diplomatic envoys from Qatar, putting huge pressure on Doha.45 As the tension
rose, many articles suggested that even the option of invading the tiny country was on
the table of the Saudi decision-makers.46
In such a turbulent situation, Riyadh had the upper ground, and therefore Doha had to
withdraw. On the 17th of April, 2014, Doha agreed to a deal with the GCC countries in
which the Qatari government agreed to stop backing the Muslim Brotherhood and re-
frain from any actions which would undermine the “interests, security and stability” of
its neighbors.47
The victory of the conservative Gulf countries had its impact on the development of
Egyptian politics as well. The time frame of the Qatari power-shift is telling in itself. The
Muslim Brotherhood lost its most generous ally on the 25th of June, 2013; eight days lat-
er the Saudi-backed Egyptian army announced the end of Morsi’s presidency. Because
of the overlap of the two events, we cannot establish any certain causality between
them; it is possible that as the new Qatari emir turned away from the Muslim Brother-
hood, al-Sisi felt secure enough to overthrow Morsi; but we can also imagine that since
Doha knew that the army would crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood, it tried to
publicly distance itself from the soon-to-be fallen president. And, of course, it is also
plausible that such causality does not exist in this case at all, and everything we can see
here is accidental.
Nevertheless, we can be sure about one thing. Without the financial and moral support
of Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood’s chance to rebound is shrinking. Doha is currently
in a delicate situation. On the one hand, they want to move away from the imprisoned
Morsi; but on the other, they cannot break all their ties with the Muslim Brotherhood
at once.
In conclusion there is some evidence that suggests that Doha can play a very important
role with a wide set of soft power tools; nonetheless, when it comes to power politics,
its fragile geopolitical situation and its vulnerability to its only inland neighbor, Saudi
Arabia, make it impossible for the tiny country to make a stand. The proxy cold war
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which was fought by Doha and Riyadh in Egypt looks to be over, with not much of a
chance for Qatar or the Muslim Brotherhood to rebound.
Final recommendations
The most important question of the near future in regard to this topic is whether Qatar
will respect the agreement signed in April 2014. Doha’s commitment to it is rather ques-
tionable, and therefore analysts and political decision makers should keep track of any
related development.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ability to survive is also doubtful. The complete annihila-
tion of the Egyptian branch would have a serious effect on the whole region, and there-
fore researchers should pay close attention to any piece of information connected with
the organization.
The internal dynamics of the conservative bloc of the Gulf should also be investigated
more thoroughly. Although the dominant role of Saudi Arabia is beyond any doubts,
the regional influence of the smaller Gulf states is also rising, especially that of the Unit-
ed Arab Emirates. The political and economic elite should look for any signs which
would imply that the federal state is attempting to build an image of itself as more in-
dependent from Riyadh.
Finally, analysts should examine the signs of future improvements or further deteriora-
tion of the Saudi-Qatari relationship outside Egypt. The conflicting interests of the two
states undoubtedly have an effect on the regional dynamics, and therefore one cannot
understand the Syrian conflict, the Iranian nuclear talks or the Middle Eastern politics
itself without considering this aspect.
Máté Szalai is a Ph.D. student at Corvinus University of Budapest and he is currently
working as a project coordinator at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.
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